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Abstract: The logistical challenge of coordinating natural resource management 
actions across large scales is typically complicated by the diversity of stakehold-
ers’ interests. Devising a plan is difficult. Getting diverse stakeholders to agree to 
and adhere to any logistical solution is harder still. Hence logistical solutions to 
large-scale problems involve a combination of coordination, and trust-building 
and contestation which are two key features of collaboration. We studied net-
works based on stakeholder participation in institutional responses to agricultural 
pest and disease incursions, where the spatial complexity of response is further 
challenged by the need to design and implement plans quickly in order to stop 
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the spread of incursions. Using data from the 2010 Australian myrtle rust incur-
sion, we used novel statistical network methods which showed that policy forums 
at national scales, where higher-level decisions are made, were associated with 
denser overlapping stakeholder interactions signifying collaboration (bonding-
capital, high transaction-costs). Our qualitative data unpacked this, showing how 
at times uncertainty in process and information is used by some stakeholders to 
contest decisions at national scales. We failed to find statistical evidence that at 
local scales, where plans are implemented more-or-less at face value, networks 
exhibited lower-transaction cost interactions associated with the socially cheaper 
task of coordination (bridging-capital, low transaction-costs). By identifying the 
mix of coordination and collaboration in networks for solving environmental 
problems, capacity building can be more targeted, and rules-of-behaviour can be 
developed that better fit the requirements of the diverse tasks involved.
Keywords: Agriculture, eucalyptus rust, exponential random graph model, risk 
hypothesis, social network theory
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1. Introduction
The management of natural resources over large-scales typifies the challenge of 
decision-making given complexity (Young 2002; Marshall 2008; Lubell et al. 
2010). Part of the challenge is in planning the coordination of logistical opera-
tions across space. However, the harder part, even with the best laid plans, is in 
getting diverse stakeholders who will likely have competing interests to agree to 
and adhere to any logistical solution. In most real world problems involving mul-
tiple stakeholders with competing interests, perfect cooperation is highly unlikely, 
and instead coordination in making and implementing decisions requires a good 
deal of contestation (Berardo and Scholz 2010; Lubell et al. 2010). We study the 
management of plant and pest outbreaks in agriculture, where the logistics of 
attempting coordinated, science-based eradication is set within the context of: 
industries and states contesting who will pay for response efforts (Beale et al. 
2008); national Governments balancing free-trade (Maye et al. 2012); and the 
otherwise diverging interests of multiple biosecurity stakeholders (Gilmour et al. 
2011; Reed and Curzon 2015; Farbotko et al. 2016). Contestation and coordina-
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tion are both features of how plant and pest outbreaks are managed, and success-
ful eradication will depend on a better understanding of the roles they each play. 
We employ statistical network methods and qualitative data to explore where and 
how contestation happens in a biosecurity response system that is designed to 
produce rapid, coordinated response to pest and disease outbreaks.
In terms of understanding where contestation and coordination happens dur-
ing an incursion response we first need to define how these two terms are different 
(Keast et al. 2007; McNamara 2012). For ‘coordination problems’, stakeholders 
are assumed to display trustworthy and predicable behaviours. Behaviour will be 
fairly certain where it is stipulated by organisational policy, law, or strong pre-
existing social norms. This means that for coordination, stakeholder agreement 
on what actions to take is assumed and any logistical instructions can be like-
wise assumed to be followed without objection. Following the ‘risk-hypothesis’, 
another angle on coordination is that where, in the task of solving complex prob-
lems, interacting stakeholders can derive no individual benefits by acting deceit-
fully, then mutual trust will be a feature of interactions (Berardo and Scholz 2010; 
Berardo 2014a, b). The real advantage of coordination problems is that the vol-
ume and depth of communication can be succinct – there are real transaction costs 
associated with interacting (see McAllister and Taylor 2015), and so in coordina-
tion problems a shared goal can be achieved with lower cost.
Where there is contestation in the pursuit of complex goals, there is less intrin-
sic certainty about stakeholder behaviours and collaboration is required in order 
to find a solution. Collaboration refers to participatory decision-making where 
any norms used to govern the decision-making processes need to be developed as 
part of the partnership (McNamara 2012). In collaboration key behaviours are not 
stipulated by organisational policy, law, or strong pre-existing social norms – or at 
least there is no adherence to these (McNamara 2012). And in this context, when 
negotiating diverging interests, as opposed to in problems of coordination, it is 
likely that stakeholders can boost their own payoffs by acting selfishly (Berardo 
and Scholz 2010; Berardo 2014a,b). Trust is needed therefore, and yet cannot be 
assumed (Gilmour et al. 2011). Whereas in problems of coordination the high 
transaction costs of interacting can be minimised, in collaboration dense and over-
lapping relationships are required in order to build trust and work toward behav-
ioural or operational norms as a precursor to coordination. 
In this paper we study Australia’s response to an outbreak of the disease ‘myr-
tle rust’, as a case study into the balance of contestation/collaboration and coordi-
nation in plant pest and disease biosecurity. The ultimately unsuccessful attempt 
to eradicate myrtle rust was hotly contested, involving more than 250 stakehold-
ers from all states (and territories) of Australia across local, state and national 
scales. Recent studies explored the structural patterns of how stakeholders with 
different interests participate in environmental governance, with a view to identi-
fying if those structures predispose, or result from, collaboration or coordination. 
Such conceptual approaches have been applied to collaborative water governance 
(Lubell et al. 2014; Berardo 2014a; Berardo and Lubell 2016), climate change 
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planning (McAllister et al. 2014), plant biosecurity (McAllister et al. 2015a), and 
regional-scale conservation (Guerrero et al. 2015a,b). Following these studies, 
we conceptualise our network as a set of organisational stakeholders who are con-
nected to each other indirectly via mutual participation in the set of committees 
and working groups (policy forums, see Fischer and Leifeld 2015) which organ-
ised the response and subsequent management programs. 
Where previous studies have focused on stakeholders as the unit of analysis, 
our study focuses on the working groups and committees (thereafter called forums) 
that form during response to biosecurity outbreaks. We test whether forums within 
our networks were associated with different structural characteristics depending 
on whether their role was to produce high-level decisions, make plans for on-
the-ground action, or implement actions on-the-ground. Additionally, we used 
qualitative interviews to provide contextual data on stakeholder behaviours. Our 
study contributes to the development of emerging approaches for studying the 
multi-scale networks for environmental governance. It also adds new empirical 
dimensions to discussions on how coordination and collaboration differ (Keast 
et al. 2007; McNamara 2012), and to debates surrounding how each express them-
selves across networks in response to the uncertainties faced by diverse stake-
holders (Lubell 2013; Berardo 2014a,b; McAllister et al. 2015b).
2. Background and hypothesis
2.1. Policy forums across the Australian biosecurity response system
Australian management of plant pest and disease outbreaks that meet criteria 
regarding impact and likelihood of eradication fall under the Emergency Plant 
Pest Response Deed (thereafter called the ‘Deed’) – a legally binding agreement 
between all Australian governments (national, state) and participating national 
plant industry bodies (Biosecurity Emergency Preparedness Working Group 
2012; Plant Health Australia 2005, 2011, 2013, 2015a,b). Ratified in 2005, the 
Deed covers the management and funding of responses, and formalises the roles 
of plant industries’ participation in decision making. The Deed also provides 
guidelines for response procedures, outlines the phases of response, and the key 
roles and responsibilities of industry and government during each phase.
One result of the Deed is the rapid establishment of a generic organisational 
structure as incursions occur. This structure has two functions: (1) provision of 
strategic policy and direction, and (2) planning and implementation of operational 
activities (Biosecurity Emergency Preparedness Working Group 2012). This 
structure includes the formation of policy forums – debriefings, working groups, 
standing committees, expert panels, and existing high-level committees where the 
response became an agenda item. 
We conceptualised the structure of response as a set of forums, where the 
characteristics of various forums range in organisational leadership, size, and 
decision-making mode (Fischer and Leifeld 2015). These forums also cut across 
local to national scales (Figure 1). Even though a generic structure will apply to 
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all incursions, the specifics of who participates where in a response will depend 
on which stakeholders are most relevant given the pest or disease, and how those 
in charge of any response interpret nuances of the Deed. Furthermore, across the 
various participants, the motivations for participation will be diverse (Fischer and 
Leifeld 2015). In summary, even though each response has a generic organisa-
tional structure under the Deed, each response will have unique structural patterns 
of stakeholder participation (e.g. McAllister et al. 2015a).
2.2. Decision-making – national scale
Two key national forums handle high-level decision making during an incursion. 
The Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant Pests (thereafter called the 
‘Consultative Committee’) and the National Management Group for Plant Pest 
Emergencies (thereafter called the ‘National Management Group’) are convened 
during a response event (Plant Health Australia 2011, 2013, 2015a,b).
The Consultative Committee is the key technical body that links all levels 
of government, industry, Plant Health Australia and the National Management 
Group during an emergency response. Mandated representation includes all 
state chief plant health managers, a representative from the national biosecurity 
agency and a non-voting representative from Plant Health Australia (http://www.
agriculture.gov.au/plant/health/committees/ccepp). Affected industry representa-
tives are invited to provide two members who have voting rights on decisions. 
Figure 1: Scales of decision-making and action, as derived from the description of the general 
procedures, management structure, roles and information flow system for the handling of incur-
sions at national, state and local levels (see below, Plant Health Australia 2015a). As such, 
this institutional arrangement represents the intended governance response to plant pest and 
disease incursions under the Deed.
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A person with relevant health, environment and amenity flora expertise may 
also be invited to attend committee meetings if appropriate to the emergency. 
The Consultative Committee coordinates the national response to a plant pest or 
disease, advises the National Management Group on emergency related issues, 
determines if the incident requires an emergency response, makes recommenda-
tions to the National Management Group on whether a Response Plan (and details 
of the plan) is required, considers regular reports on the progress of the Response 
Plan, and develops consensus for further actions. It also determines and advises 
the National Management Group when a pest or disease has been eradicated, and 
advises the National Management Group on economic and financial aspects of a 
response. The Consultative Committee may appoint a Scientific Advisory Panel if 
additional information or advice is required to assist in deliberations. 
The National Management Group is responsible for approving Response 
Plans, which include determining indicative budgets, cost-sharing arrangements, 
and setting upper limits on expenditure. It also manages the national policy and 
resourcing needs of a Response Plan, endorses response determination from the 
Consultative Committee, and refers matters arising out of a Response Plan to Plant 
Health Australia. The National Management Group receives technical advice and 
updates from the Consultative Committee.
2.3. Planning for action – state scale
A State Control Centre is established in the state with the incursion, normally 
in the head office of the responsible government department. The State Control 
Centre leads the design of the Response Plan for coordination of activities across 
the state. These Response Plans need to be approved by the National Management 
Group (above, Biosecurity Emergency Preparedness Working Group 2012). 
The State Control Centre does not become involved in the implementation of 
on-ground-activities, but takes charge of (1) managing the response (eradica-
tion/control) campaign in accordance with the relevant legistation, policies and 
PLANTPLAN strategies and procedures with due consideration of the economic, 
commerical and social implications of all actions taken; (2) providing accurate 
and timely advice to the government (minister), Consultative Committee, the pub-
lic, all department staff, emergency management agencies and industry; and (3) 
establishing ongoing consultative and reporting arrangements between the State 
and the Local Control Centres (Plant Health Australia 2015a).
2.4. Implementation of actions – local scale
A Local Control Centre is established in the region where the incursion has been 
detection. The Local Control Centre is guided by the objectives established by 
the State Control Centre, and has primary responsibility for conducting and sup-
porting all operational activities in its geographical area (Biosecurity Emergency 
Preparedness Working Group 2012). It may be necessary to establish more than 
one Local Control Centre, depending on the complexity or extent of the response. 
336 Ryan R. J. McAllister et al.
The Local Control Centre deploys teams to undertake tasks in the field, including 
(1) investigation – sample collection to enable diagosis or identification of a pest 
or disease and/or surveillance tasks to determine the extent of a pest or disearse 
spread; (2) area movement and security – enforcement of quarantine, possibly 
including check-point operations; and (3) infected/infested premises options – 
tasks associated with managing containment and treatment or eradication of a 
pest or disease at an infected/infested property or place (Biosecurity Emergency 
Preparedness Working Group 2012). 
2.5. Hypothesis
Where stakeholders interact in order to commit to solutions or actions relating 
to defined problems, individuals can gain the most by acting purely in their self-
interest (i.e. uncooperative) (Berardo and Scholz 2010). This does not mean indi-
viduals will always act uncooperatively – it means the potential for uncooperative 
behaviour is higher. When there is greater potential for uncooperative behaviours 
interactions either need to (1) allow time for repeated group interactions such to 
develop shared-norms and trust, or (2) limit interactions only to a clique of stake-
holders where shared-norms and trust already exist. Either way, this suggests a 
need for bonding capital in which networks is defined by dense and over-lapping 
relationships (Table 1). Bonding capital generally has high transactions costs, but 
where negotiation, trust and consensus building are critical as a precursor to coor-
dination, then bonding capital is normally required.
Table 1: Mapping bridging or bonding against network configurations in bipartite networks 
(circles representing organisational actors; squares representing policy forums).
 Configuration
Bridging for 
coordination
 
Facilitates unique links: where forums of a particular type/scale (local/
state/national) disproportionally bring stakeholders together who would not 
otherwise interact in other mutually attended forums
Bonding for 
collaboration
 
Re-enforces networks: where forums of a particular type/scale (local/state/
national) are disproportionally attended by actors who also mutually attend 
other forums (of any type/scale)
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Bridging capital, on the other hand, underpins access to additional, and there-
fore valuable, resources through unique relationships to distant parts of a network 
(Burt 2005; Putnam 1993). With bridging capital, information such as instructions 
relating to coordination, can be rapidly dispersed across a network (Carlsson and 
Sandstrom 2008). The benefits of bridging capital however can only be yielded 
in cases where the risks of encountering uncooperative behaviours are low, which 
generally requires that individuals in such interactions have little to gain from 
uncooperative behaviour. These are ‘coordination’ problems, and are common 
where stakeholders largely share the same agenda (Berardo and Scholz 2010). 
The Deed was conceived as an integrated system for the coordination and 
planning of actions across scales, and to explicitly take a degree of contestation 
out of cost-sharing negotiation. We hypothesise however that contestation is not 
only a feature of biosecurity response, but that in the forums where contestation 
takes place the patterns of participation are predisposed to have bonding capital. 
In forums where actions are implemented, bridging capital will be relatively more 
common. In other words we expect our analysis to show that the patterns of par-
ticipating in biosecurity response forums will look very different for nationally 
compared to locally scaled forums.
Using the Australian response for the myrtle rust incursion as our case study 
(below), we use qualitative data to probe the nature of contestation in the nation-
ally scaled forums, and across local, state and national forums we collect and 
analyse network data to determine if bonding and/or bridging capital is present 
more or less than can be explained by chance (Table 1). We coded the forums 
by scale and use an Exponential random Graph Model (Frank and Strauss 1986; 
Wasserman and Pattison 1996) to test which patterns dominate at which scales.
Our hypothesis is thus:
We expect that contestation is an element of some, but not all, parts of the 
Australian biosecurity response system, and that the patterns of stakeholder 
participation in response will be denser and with greater over-lapping rela-
tionships in the parts of the response network at national scales where deci-
sions need to be negotiated (bonding capital). At local scales, where plans are 
implemented more or less at face value, patterns of participation will have 
fewer over-lapping interactions with other stakeholders (bridging capital). 
3. Case-study, data and methods
Myrtle rust was first detected in April 2010 on a native flower plantation in New 
South Wales, a state jurisdiction in eastern Australia (Carnegie et al. 2010). To 
date, all attempts to eradicate and contain myrtle rust in Australia have been 
unsuccessful. Our data show how the Australian biosecurity response system 
structured it’s attempted eradication and management. Plant pathology diagnosis 
described this rust as a new species Uredo rangelii and although regarded as a 
member of the Puccini psidii ensu lato complex (Simpson et al. 2006; Carnegie 
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et al. 2010), it was considered to be morphologically distinct from Puccini psidii. 
Puccini psidii, commonly known as guava/eucalyptus rust, was first detected on 
guava in Brazil and has long been considered a significant threat to Australian 
Eucalyptus and other myrtaceous plant industries and ecosystems (Grgurinovic 
et al. 2006; Glen et al. 2007; Pegg et al. 2014). As such the Australian Nursery and 
Garden Industry was particularly concerned due to risks to nursery production, 
timber, and cut-flower production (Nursery and Garden Industry Australia 2012).
The diagnosis of myrtle rust triggered an emergency response under the Deed 
(23 April 2010), led by the New South Wales state government. At a Consultative 
Committee meeting (27 April 2010) it was decided that the initial response would 
include delimiting surveys in the suspected target area to decide whether it was 
technically feasible to eradicate. As it was determined that the rust had likely 
been at the reporting property for several months, and that infected plant material 
had been shipped to the Sydney Flower Markets during this time, a meeting of 
the Consultative Committee on 30 April 2010 deemed that myrtle rust was not 
technically feasible to eradicate, and the national support for the response was 
stood down. However, on 6 May 2010 the Consultative Committee reconsidered 
this decision, thereafter providing New South Wales with support to suppress 
the rust and delimit the infected area. During this time the National Biosecurity 
Committee convened and developed a National Management Plan for myrtle rust 
to identify immediate and longer term management actions, including clearly dis-
tinguishing between U. rangelii and P. Psidii; assessing the impact of rust on the 
native environment; conducting host testing; and determining the potential geo-
graphic spread of the rust (see Carnegie and Cooper 2011 for summary of stages 
of the response).
3.1. Network Data
To measure how stakeholders at various scales interacted within a biosecurity 
response, data were collected on every forum deemed part of the myrtle rust 
response, including who participated in each forum (Figure 2). These forums 
spanned 2010 to 2013. Our network is multi-level (bipartite), with a tie between 
a forum and actor defined by participation of an actor in a forum. This approach 
builds on McAllister et al.’s (2015a) study of the 2001 ‘black sigatoka’ outbreak 
in Northern Queensland. Government ‘situation’ and ‘incident’ reports held by 
the Queensland and New South Wales State Governments, and information pro-
vided by the Australian Government were used as the main data source (under the 
appropriate human ethics clearances, CSIRO’s Social Science Human Research 
Ethics Committee #071/12). We combined various records to make a complete 
de-identified dataset of stakeholder participation across all response forums relat-
ing to the myrtle rust response. We cross checked this dataset with key informants 
for accuracy. In total twelve working-groups were recorded as being formally 
part of the response to myrtle rust. We coded these forums into three groups 
 discussed above: (1) decision making (national scale); (2) planning (state scale); 
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(3)  implementation (local scale). Other forums not relevant to testing our hypoth-
esis were those for information sharing and science reference groups (Table 2).1 
3.2. Exponential Random Graph Model (ERGM)
The key conceptual approach of our analysis is in looking within networks to iden-
tify what sub-patterns (so called configurations) occur more or less than could be 
expected by chance alone. Over or under representation of certain  configurations 
1
 All de-identified network data, forum codes, and additional codes for actor scale can be provided 
upon request.
Figure 2: Graphical representation of the multi-level (bipartite) network data, with squares/
circles showing forums/individuals; N, S and L show national, state and local forum scales; 
network’s (p-clique) core lightly-shaded for graphical purposes only.
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can then be used to infer the presence of important social and political processes 
(e.g. Bodin and Tengo 2012; Berardo 2014a; Lubell et al. 2014; McAllister et al. 
2014; Guerrero et al. 2015a,b; McAllister et al. 2015a,b; Bodin et al. 2016; Bodin 
et al. in press). To statistically identify over or under representation of configura-
tions we used an Exponential Random Graph Model (ERGM), a statistical net-
work methodology (Frank and Strauss 1986; Wasserman and Pattison 1996).
ERGMs assume networks are the result of a stochastic process. Any observed 
network is treated as a single observation which can be compared to a distribution 
of all possible networks with a core set of identical characteristics (e.g. number 
of nodes and ties) (Robins et al. 2007). In this way the observed frequency of 
configurations can be statistically compared to their potential frequency based on 
other possible networks reconfigurations, assessing whether configurations are 
observed in a network more or less frequently than could be expected by chance 
alone. ERGMs allow for statistical inferences to be made without the need for 
multiple networks for comparison.
ERGM also account for nested configurations – for example, from Table 1, 
with each ‘bonding for collaboration’ configuration there are potentially two 
nested ‘bridging for cooperation’ configurations. By assessing frequencies of con-
figurations relative to other potentially nested configurations ERGMs progress 
on conceptually comparable approaches that focus on frequency counts (Bodin 
and Tengo 2012). Assessments also need to control for the general level of activ-
ity displayed by each scale of stakeholder. This ‘baseline activity’ can also be 
interpreted as a measure of how active stakeholders have been in the response 
network. 
ERGMs are a statistical model and accordingly estimates a coefficient for 
each configuration included in a model. These coefficients reflect the chances 
Table 2: Participation across various forums (working-groups, committees).
Forum  Number of Participants
National – Decision making
 Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant Pests  84
 National Management Group  52
State – Planning action
 State Control Centre – Queensland  21
 State Control Centre – New South Wales  11
Local – Implementation of action
 Local Control Centre – Queensland  10
 Local Control Centre – New South Wales  40
Information sharing and science
 Plant Health Committee meetings on myrtle rust  49
 Plant Health Committee Myrtle Rust Briefing  31
 Queensland Government Myrtle Rust Briefing  46
 National Scientific Advisory Committee  20
 Transition to Management  45
 National Scientific Advisory Committee for Transition to Management  14
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of observing ties. The signs of the coefficients quantify if configurations are 
observed more (positive coefficient) or less (negative coefficient) than can be 
expected by chance alone, and the t-scores of the coefficients quantify if this dis-
crepancy between observation and expectation is statistically significant (Wang 
et al. 2009). One of the limitations of ERGMs is that the algorithms for estimating 
coefficients frequently fail to converge. For this reason ERGMs tend to be parsi-
monious, including only the most important configurations for understanding foci 
questions.
After fitting the model, additional configurations can be examined using a 
residual structural effects approach (e.g. see Lubell 2015; McAllister et al. 2015b). 
Here, a fitted model is used to simulate a sample of networks. The distribution of 
selected configurations across the simulated networks can then be compared to 
the counts from the observed network. If the observed count of configurations is 
statistically greater when compared to the simulated networks, it can then be con-
cluded that the configurations are more abundant than can be explained by fitted 
model, adding evidence that there are more of these configurations than can be 
expected by chance alone.
3.3. Qualitative methods
Standing members, invited members and members representing industry involved 
in the Consultative Committee during the myrtle rust response were identified 
from the Consultative Committee minutes. Members were approached and 12 
of these agreed to be interviewed. Three members of the Scientific Advisory 
Panel were also interviewed and all members of the National Management Group 
were approached with four agreeing to be interviewed. Interviews were taped if 
permission was granted and/or extensive notes were taken during the interview. 
Interviewees were asked about their perspective on how the myrtle rust response 
was managed by the forum in which they held membership. Specific questions 
probed how well different types of information was communicated and trans-
lated to make decisions; and how members of each forum negotiated and com-
mitted to sharing responsibility for biosecurity actions and decisions. Interviews 
were transcribed and imported into NVivo for coding and analysis. This analysis 
was informed by grounded theory to enable generic themes and relationships to 
be identified and understood from the interview data (Boyatzis 1998). Themes 
were focused around stakeholder categories (e.g. government, industry) and then 
related using axial coding that focused on forum variables (e.g. Consultative 
Committee, Scientific Advisory Panel, National Management Group) that led to 
the identification of the nature of contestation (e.g. uncertainty, trust, etc.) sur-
rounding the myrtle rust response.
The categories of contestation were then related to each policy forum 
(Consultative Committee, Scientific Advisory Committee and National 
Management Group). This enabled the nuance of issues around contestation to 
be distilled (i.e. did a lack of trust result from uncertainty around the data, or the 
342 Ryan R. J. McAllister et al.
ways in which decisions were made, or implemented) and related to the purpose 
and mandate of each policy forum. Coding also highlighted how and why mem-
bers participated in each policy forum and categorised perspectives on the advan-
tages and challenges identified from participating in these forums.
4. Results
Our Exponential Random Graph Models contained six fairly simple bipartite con-
figurations (Table 3). Three configurations neither specified type/scale of actor 
nor forum. These were: an activity configuration; a star configuration with one 
forum and two actors; and, a star configuration with one forum and three actors. 
The remaining three configurations were activity configurations accounting for 
ties between actors and national, state and local forums respectively (noting in 
this analysis actors were not coded). Such ‘simple’ configurations and/or configu-
rations without coded nodes are important because they provide a control mea-
sure to help make unbiased interpretations of the more complex and often nested 
configurations (similar to an intercept term in a simple linear regression model). 
Indeed it is problematic to interpret any configurations that are not controlled 
for by a simpler configuration. We can for example interpret the positive sign 
on the national-activity configuration (0.832/6.3534***), but only because it is 
controlled for by the generic activity configuration. Hence we can say that the 
national-activity coefficient shows nationally-scaled forums are associated with 
significantly more ties than could be expected based on chance alone, given the 
number of generic actor-forum ties across the network.
Multi-level networks are notoriously hard to solve using Exponential Random 
Graph Models. While our primary interest was to test the over or under represen-
tation of scale/type-specific forums indicating bonding or bridging (see Table 1), 
extensive testing failed to produce any models that could adequately include such 
configurations. Hence, in order to assess the over/under representation of forum 
specific configurations we relied on goodness-of-fit (Lubell et al. 2014; McAllister 
et al. 2015b). The fitted Model was used to simulate 2000 random graphs (using 
the package MPnet Wang et al. 2014) and simulated counts of configurations were 
compared to those observed. 
For the configurations already included in the Model, the subsequent good-
ness-of-fit provided a quality check. Given the included configurations are used as 
the basis for simulation, the simulated and observed counts should be statistically 
identical, and they are (Table 3, Column [2]).
For the forum specific configurations showing bonding and bridging (Table 1), 
having significantly higher observed counts than the simulated networks provides 
evidence configurations occur at levels higher than could be expected by chance 
(after controlling for those configurations in the Model). Our results show the 
bonding/collaboration configuration for national forums is observed significantly 
more often than expected by chance. No other configurations were significant 
(Table 3, Column [2]).
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In total 259 actors participated across the 12 forums in the response to myrtle 
rust. Many actors participated as part of their statutory roles. ERGMs assume sto-
chasticity, and therefore we ran a second model with fixed ties where 19 known 
statutory roles made participation statutory in certain forums (Table 3, column 
[3–4]). The results are broadly consistent, the only exception being the residual 
analysis shows bonding/collaboration configurations for the state forums became 
weakly, significantly positive (Table 3, column [4]).
5. Discussion and qualitative analysis
Our hypothesis related to the balance of coordination and collaboration across 
the various policy forums for biosecurity. The ratio of observed collaborative to 
coordinating structures is nearly five times higher for nationally-scaled forums 
compared to those at the local scale (see Table 3). Yet, we failed to find statisti-
cal evidence to show that at local scales, where plans are implemented more-or-
less at face value, networks exhibited interactions associated with the socially 
cheaper task of coordination (bridging-capital, low transaction-costs). However, 
at national scales, where biosecurity response policy forums are designed to make 
higher-level decisions, stakeholder interactions were associated with denser over-
lapping ties signifying collaboration (bonding-capital, high transaction-costs). 
Overall we conclude partial support for our hypothesis, with some structural 
evidence of contestation in the national decision-making forums. Without stron-
ger quantitative evidence, the qualitative evidence is particularly important, and 
we use this to explore the nature of contestation in the national decision-making 
forums, and how this evolved over the course of the Australian response to the 
myrtle rust incursion. 
5.1. Analysis of national scale perceptions on uncertainty
Analysis of the in-depth qualitative interviews found that the Consultative 
Committee and National Management Group participants engaged in some con-
testation, which is a signature of collaborative processes rather than straight coor-
dination (see Keast et al. 2007). Group members experienced uncertainty, but 
also reported exploitation of uncertainty in order to contest key decisions during 
the myrtle rust response. Uncertainty surrounding stakeholder interactions were 
underpinned by multiple and competing interests. While contestation appeared 
focused on Deed processes and the classification of information, it was under-
pinned by how subsequent decisions distributed the costs and benefits across 
jurisdictions and stakeholders. The qualitative analysis identified two dimensions 
of how uncertainty contributed to risk in stakeholder interactions: (1) uncertainty 
surrounded the accuracy of the information used to assess biosecurity risk; and 
(2) there was ambiguity in the process by which forums negotiated decisions and 
how key responsibilities were assigned. These interview findings were notable 
given the role of the Deed is to provide response procedures for coordination of 
response action.
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Elements of mistrust and a lack of shared norms that can exist in collaborative 
forums were evident from the interview data. Scientific authorities expressed cau-
tion in using the technical advice being provided to the Consultative Committee, 
while industry representatives questioned if their input really impacted final deci-
sions. For example, industry representatives were told their input was valued, 
but they expressed the concern that their input was not really incorporated into 
the emergency response’s risk assessments. Furthermore, delays in declaring the 
myrtle rust outbreak as an ‘emergency’ were seen by some as a lack of govern-
ment commitment to share the costs of the response, adding to mistrust.
One major debate involving participants of the Consultative Committee and 
National Management Group related to the taxonomic naming of the rust in 
Australia (Carnegie and Cooper 2011). Debates around the naming of the rust 
were underpinned by the politics of what a name implies. The naming of the 
pest was described by one science advisor as a “breach of trust” suggesting that 
advice was re-interpreted to reflect political ideologies. Another member on the 
Consultative Committee reflected on how and why the rust taxonomy was chosen:
“…it was deliberately put forward that what we had in Australia was not euca-
lyptus rust that it was a different strain, it was given a new name called myrtle 
rust, basically I assume the intention was ….. to down-play the significance of 
the incursion in Australia”. 
Under the Deed, how the costs of responding to incursions are shared across 
governments and industry is dependant partly on whether or not the incursion is 
deemed eradicable, or alternatively something that requires on-going manage-
ment. It is perhaps not surprising then that the Committee participants debated 
whether or not eradication was technically feasible. 
An initial decision by the Consultative Committee that eradication of myrtle 
rust was not technically feasible was subsequently contested by industry groups. 
Land surveys also suggested that the rust did not seem to be spreading, and 
this was used to support the case for a high upfront investment in eradication. 
Ultimately the National Management Group reassessed its earlier decision, agree-
ing to shift from management to contain the disease, into emergency response 
mode seeking eradication. Many of the government and industry representatives 
on the Consultative Committee interviewed for this study noted that trust in the 
process had been tested during this particular period in the response, despite the 
intention of the Deed to promote cooperation.
5.2. Networks dynamics
The qualitative and quantitative data support the hypothesis that bonding capi-
tal is a feature of national decision-making forums, as actors build overlap-
ping relationships in order to mitigate relationship risks (Berardo and Scholz 
2010). The quantitative data support the idea that such relationship risk is expe-
rienced differently in different parts of the response network (Berardo 2014a; 
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McAllister et al. 2015b). What our qualitative analysis adds is the dynamic 
nature of bonding and bridging activities at higher Consultative Committee and 
National Management Group scales. Contestation was evident at the start of 
the biosecurity incursion – but this was patchy and contained to a few deci-
sion-makers who were initially invited to the decision-making forums. In part 
this reflected the influence of informal collaborative networks that formed in 
the effort to adapt policy-level changes. Different actors also participated in 
different stages of the response. As one environmental agency member on the 
Consultative Committee reflected:
“We came into the process later on … much of this was because various 
groups got together to highlight what a serious issue this was”.
New participants joining the response in later stages introduced new thinking, 
notably the view that environmental impacts of the rust were previously under-
estimated in the initial cost-benefit analysis. For example, when the Department 
of the Environment ran a workshop on the myrtle rust, many local environmental 
groups added new perspectives and interests – namely that eucalyptus trees were 
important for a range of conservation issues but also that there were many cul-
tural, social and economic services that would be affected by this rust.
Individual intermediaries were at times overtly political in that they delib-
erately acted across a particular set of relationships in order to achieve a par-
ticular goal (cf. Moss et al. 2009). Interviewees highlighted that there was some 
debate about whether these ‘covert’ forms of governance corrupted or enabled 
consensus-building efforts. As one Consultative Committee explained with some 
exasperation:
“there were a few individuals who set up alliances outside the forums … this 
made it tricky for those working through a formal way to reach consensus”.
These informal coalitions formed and dispersed rapidly but were effective too –as 
one interviewee put it: 
“bringing together a bunch of like-minded individuals across institutions to 
bring this issue back to the negotiating table”
5.3. Distilling collaboration from coordination
A key challenge for better environmental governance is moving beyond the man-
tra of collaboration as being a universal good, toward a better understanding of 
how to balance the different agendas and vested interests and behaviours which 
collectively shape policy outcomes (Lubell 2015). In 2005 Australia replaced a 
fairly ad-hoc state-based plant biosecurity response system with the nationally 
coordinated Deed (Beale et al. 2008). This new system sought to pre-determine 
many of the negotiations relating to emergency responses that had previously 
slowed down on-ground actions (e.g. who pays, Beale et al. 2008). In other words, 
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the Deed sought to reduce the volume and depth of communication required in 
attempts to eradicate pest and disease outbreaks in agriculturally significant plant 
industries. In this way the Deed anecdotally appears to shift the response along 
the continuum toward being a ‘coordination’ problem, but by broadening the set 
of stakeholders involved, paradoxically moved the system toward collaboration in 
other ways (McAllister et al. 2015a). In fact such paradoxes and complexity are 
mirrored in countless examples of environmental governance problems globally 
– from irrigation for agriculture (Edelenbos and van Meerkerk 2015; Hoogesteger 
2015; Margerum and Robinson 2015), through to policies around environmen-
tal and industry trade-offs (Robinson et al. 2011; Frey and Berkes 2014; Prager 
2015). Across such examples, moving beyond the crude mantra of collaboration 
being a universal ‘good’ requires a better understanding of where collaboration 
sits alongside other forms of interaction.
Our research shows how at national scales there remains, at times, a high 
degree of contestation that detracts from the emergency response roll-out and 
thereby delays the formation of plans and implementation of action on-the-
ground. This adds some support to our hypothesis, and is consistent with research 
that shows dense network structures form in parts of policy networks where stake-
holders perceive there to be aspects of risk and uncertainty in their interactions 
with others (Berardo 2014a; McAllister et al. 2014). Our data also highlight that 
our participants not only experienced uncertainty, but at times exploited it to sup-
port their agendas.
Bargaining and political power are key elements of decision making (Ostrom 
2010; Lubell 2013) and Kruger’s (2016) study of fruit-fly management shows 
how biosecurity needs to navigate diverse interests which span backyard growers 
to issues of export market access, and frequently have collective implications. 
In the context of Australian response to pest and disease incursions, the 2005 
reforms changed where and how politics plays a role in biosecurity – they did not 
remove it – and removing politics from biosecurity seems unrealistic (Robinson 
and Whitehead 2003; Farbotko et al. 2016). In our case study the response net-
works, designed for the rapid and relatively cheaper task of coordination, stray 
into the slower, more expensive task of collaboration. Real world problems with 
diverse sets of stakeholders will also contain a mix of coordination and collabora-
tion, and effective coordination requires the identification of appropriate spaces 
for contestation with rules and processes that embrace and expedite those disputes 
in a constructive manner. 
While above we examine differences between decision-making, planning and 
implementation for responding to plant pest and disease outbreak, they are all part 
of the same system. Collective action is where natural resources are managed by 
communities and stakeholders who play a central role in shaping the rules that 
govern how those resources are used. For pure collective action problems, the 
networks between resource users need not only to coordinate management and 
use across scales, but also foster the creation, maintenance and functioning of the 
rules. Where resources are managed by centrally created, and well maintained 
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and enforced rules, then the networks for natural resource management can be 
leaner – with lower density networks needing only to coordinate action. Real 
world problems are neither managed collectively by communities and stakehold-
ers nor centrally managed by governments. Rules-on-paper are locally interpreted 
and mixed with other behavioural drivers to help shape the rules-in-practice 
(Young 2002; Ostrom 2005). Not only is there a continuum across problems, but 
within problems different stakeholders rely on different rules to solve their part of 
the same problem (Lubell et al. 2010).
5.4. Implications for biosecurity
Reed and Curzon (2015) describe biosecurity governance “as the decision-mak-
ing that occurs across different groups about biosecurity, which may be expressed 
through a range of different strategies and other documents”, and this view 
accords with our analysis of biosecurity response. However, the diversity of how 
and why stakeholders participate in biosecurity responses has both advantages 
and challenges. The challenge focuses on the friction introduced where stakehold-
ers hold different perspectives on the ‘facts’ (Farbotko et al. 2016). Diversity of 
stakeholders also adds transaction costs (see McAllister and Taylor 2015). Yet, 
greater participation potentially reduces uncertainty by broadening the base of 
knowledge types used in decision-making (Stringer et al. 2006; Reed and Curzon 
2015). Participation also increases legitimacy of decisions, potentially reducing 
contestation from otherwise excluded groups (Reed and Curzon 2015).
Further, although processes for collaboration have a larger transaction cost 
than those for coordination, collaboration can produce an end-result that is likely 
to satisfy the management needs of a larger number of stakeholders. As such con-
testation and conflict can be considered as a positive part of decision-making, 
whereby different stakeholders use a variety of mechanisms to voice their man-
agement concerns (Maclean et al. 2015). 
The implication here is consistent with other research showing that purpose-
ful consideration needs to be given to a range of mechanisms used to engage with 
different stakeholders, from farm-gate to policy makers, and at different times 
(Stringer et al. 2006). The advantages of diversity can only be yielded if enough 
trust is built into relationships such that the different perspectives can be mutually 
respected. Our assertion is that collaboration between diverse stakeholders should 
be fostered via an ongoing process that includes engagement plans tailored to 
build trust and transparency between actors. The result will be a quicker path to 
consensus during pest and disease incursion when action is time critical.
There are also implications for how to guide targeted capacity development 
investments, and how to define and refine expected behavioural norms that are 
more specific to the diversity of key policy forums. Politics is an unavoidable 
element of biosecurity. In appreciating this it follows that capacity developments 
should be specific to the needs of actors operating in different parts of the bios-
ecurity system. Where stakeholder interactions relate to coordination then techni-
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cal capacities remain the core skillset. But where interactions are collaborative, 
capacity development needs to shift to away from science capability towards the 
development of skills for negotiation, conflict resolution, and also include ways 
to manage the expectations of diverse stakeholders. 
6. Conclusions
This paper explores the mix of coordination and collaboration using statistical 
network theory to examine how the type of policy forum impacts on the structures 
of stakeholder participation. The myrtle rust case study provides the context for 
exploration and qualitative data were also used to examine stakeholder perceptions 
of what occurred within key forums during an emergency pest response. We con-
tribute to debates about the role of risk in relationships in shaping how policy net-
works structure (Berardo and Scholz 2010), and in particular to how sub-networks 
are structured differently in and across networks as different sets of actors seek to 
solve distinct sub-problems within broader environment governance challenges 
(Berardo 2014a; McAllister et al. 2015b). We also help develop new conceptual 
approaches for analysing networks that focus on the building-blocks, rather than 
whole of network patterns (Bodin and Tengo 2012; Bodin et al. 2016). There are 
applied implications of our paper too. The nature of environmental governance in 
the face of diverse and competing interests is an ongoing and important domain 
of research (see Lubell 2015). The current Australian institutional response for 
plant pest and disease incursions is an important case study of this complexity. In 
such cases, by acknowledging and identifying the different types of stakeholder 
interactions across environmental governance challenges, any contestation can 
be constructive and efficient rather than left unmanaged, and hence delays during 
time-critical operations minimised.
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